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Numerous studies find that public opinion can constrain military policy. Less is known, however, about how, if at all, the identity of an adversary can moderate levels of popular support. In this study, I use an original survey experiment to test the impact of an insurgent group’s religious identity on individuals’ preferences for counterinsurgency policy.
My preliminary findings suggest that publics favor more coercive force against religious, compared to secular nationalist, insurgents. They also see repression as a more efficacious strategy than accommodation for resolving conflicts with religious combatants. I argue that these findings are due to what religious studies scholars refer to as the myth of religious violence – a popular notion that religion is a violent and irrational force that must be contained by the state in order to preserve social order.
This study has important implications for how we think about the relationship between public opinion, religion, and civil war. First, it draws attention to a possible lack of restraint when fighting religious opponents. This might explain, in part, why governments continue to rely on repression despite mixed results. Second, this study speaks to the larger debate concerning the role of religion in conflict. Even when religion is not the cause of a conflict, it can shape combatants’, including national militaries’, behavior in significant ways.