Impartiality In International Courts: Evidence From A Natural Experiment

• In Event: The Role of Bureaucrats in International Cooperation

Abstract

The impartiality of international judges is one of the cornerstones of the international system. Despite the obvious importance of the topic, both for the international judiciary system and for countries involved with it, with a few exceptions, we know little about the extent to which judges are indeed impartial, and if they are not, about the sources of their biases. To shed light on these fundamental issues, I present new evidence by exploiting a natural experiment in the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body (AB) in which international judges - the members of the AB - are randomly assigned to cases. Panel composition is consequential for countries, who see their claims more likely to be affected when they face a panel with a co-national judge. However, further tests demonstrates this is driven by US influence. Other mechanisms such as socialization to US education or development status are ruled out. These findings contribute to debates about the role of US foreign policy in international organizations and to the politics of international law in general.

Author

• Eric Arias, College of William & Mary