Sticky Institutions? Institutional Change and Foreign Policy

• In Event: Regime Type and Foreign Policy

Abstract

In this paper we apply a model of institutional change to Israel to explore the effects of changes in electoral systems on foreign policy. The Israeli case is both interesting and informative for a number of reasons: First, it is a Western-style democracy and thus compatible with the existing literature. Second, it is involved in a longstanding international conflict, which adds a new element to our understanding of the conditions under which democratic institutions operate. Third, existing studies of Israeli parliamentary effects have focused on bargaining among political parties rather than the system itself. Finally, there has been little work on either the effects of parliamentary systems on foreign policy or on Israel itself since the early 2000s; this research updates and adds to the literature on these topics. We argue that institutional change can empower prime ministers. Major changes to an existing political-electoral structure lead to uncertainty about institutional rules and decision-making space for leaders that can, in turn, lead to major changes in public policy, specifically, foreign policy. These changes strengthen political leaders by removing constraints on their decision-making freedom, either directly via changes to rules and laws or indirectly via encouragement provided by the uncertainty generated by a newly-implemented system. Our case study is the change in Israel’s electoral system from a single vote for a party, common to parliamentary systems, to a split-ticket system from 1996 to 2001. During this period elections for political party were held alongside direct elections for prime minister. The double-vote took place in 1996 and 1999, while an election for prime minister only took place in 2001. The system was then repealed and replaced with the old single-vote system. But during this period, Israeli prime ministers felt emboldened and made decisions in foreign policy that broke with longstanding patterns and set new precedents. Our study demonstrates that institutions are durable, yet in the short term can strengthen political leaders to change policy.

Authors

• Brent D. Boyea, University of Texas at Arlington

• Brent E. Sasley, University of Texas, Arlington