Irony and Outrage: The Psychological Roots of Political Aesthetic Preferences

• In Event: Communication, Groups, and Elections

Abstract

Over the past decade, journalists and scholars have asked why political satire is so liberal. This question has been answered in various ways, from conservative outlets proposing that conservatives are black-balled from the liberal-dominated world of comedy (Mordock, 2017), to writers who point to the liberal roots of satire dating back to the 1960s, implying that this is just the way it will be forever more. Most common in these writings is the argument that since satire tends to punch up at institutions and people in power, and since conservatives tend to support the status quo, then, satire will inevitably come more from the left than the right (Dagnes,2012). And while writers and commentators have wrestled with the question of why there is little successful satire on the right, so too have they grappled with a similar conundrum on the other side: Why can’t liberal talk radio succeed?

The asymmetry in the political perspectives most successfully communicated through ironic satire, on the one hand, and through “opinion talk” or “outrage” programming on the other is inescapable. But why this divide in the preferred genre – or programming aesthetic – of liberals and conservatives?

In this summary of the core arguments advanced in my forthcoming book, Irony and Outrage: The Polarized Landscape of Fear, Rage, and Laughter in the U.S. (Oxford University Press, 2019), I explicate the internal structure and logic of satire, offering a deep dive into how satire is comprehended and appreciated in the brain, and the psychological traits of people most likely to understand and appreciate it. I also detail the characteristics of “outrage,” as articulated by Berry and Sobieraj (2014), and make the case for how this didactic, threat-oriented form of political information ought to appeal to a distinct set of psychological and physiological traits of the audience.

The project then integrates literature from political psychology, where researchers have explored the psychological and physiological roots of political ideology for decades. Tolerance for Ambiguity and Need for Cognition, two prominent psychological correlates of social/cultural conservatism (see Jost et al, 2003,2009)are also strong predictors of aesthetic preferences– shaping our tastes for different types of art, music, and literature (Chirumbolo et al., 2014; Ostrofsky & Shobe, 2015; Wiersema et. al, 2012). As such, it follows that these two very different genres of political expression - irony and outrage - can be conceptualized as aesthetic forms that appeal to distinct psychological – and hence ideological - profiles. The paper offers empirical evidence from survey and experimental research to illustrate that irony and outrage contribute to parallel outcomes (like knowledge and attitudes) among liberals and conservatives (respectively). It also presents data indicating that the high Tolerance for Ambiguity on the left is associated with increased consumption of political satire and comfort with hybrid forms of political expression, while the low Tolerance for Ambiguity of those on the right leads to greater consumption of outrage programming and discomfort with hybrid political expression. In sum, liberals’ and conservatives’ affinity for (and production of) satire and outrage (respectively), are logical extensions of the underlying psychological profiles (and epistemological orientations) of the left and the right.

In spite of their parallel functions and outcomes, I do not argue that these genres are the same. Rather, I urge us to consider how and why the capacities for the exploitation of outrage, on the one hand, and irony, on the other, are not symmetrical. Due to the symbiosis between the threat-oriented aesthetic of outrage and the psychology of the right, outrage is more viable vehicle for elite propaganda and mobilization. Meanwhile, satire remains an efficient vehicle for …markedly non-elite subversive progressive experimentation and rumination.

Author

• Dannagal G. Young, University of Delaware