Conditional Cash Transfers and Clientelism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

• In Event: Experimental Work on Citizen Engagement & Participation in the Developing World

Abstract

Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is one of the world’s largest conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) and is often cited as a success for its decentralized administration and insulation from traditional, clientelist practices. Yet, there is the lack of sys- thematic evidence about how, when, or why municipalities enroll citizens in the program or monitor beneficiary compliance with conditionalities. To fill this gap, we built an app to evaluate thousands of program beneficiaries’ opinions in three Brazilian municipalities, and we will embed in the app a list experiment to measure perceptions surrounding enrollment in the program, delivery of benefits, and conditionality compliance. List experiments are ideal for discerning socially sensitive information respondents may be unwilling to readily disclose. Respondents assigned to a control group are shown a list of plausibly accurate, innocuous information about BF implementation in their municipality. Respondents assigned to the treatment group are shown the same list, but with an added sensitive item, such as whether beneficiaries misrepresent their compliance with conditionalities. Differences in the proportion of items with which respondents agree across the treated and control group will reveal the extent to which maladministration and/or compliance misrepresentation is perceived to be common. In turn, our results will speak to questions surrounding how best to design CCTs to improve compliance, administration, and performance as these programs spread around the world.

Authors

• Amanda Driscoll

• Gabriel Cepaluni, Sao Paulo State University

• Michael Touchton, University of Miami