Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy

• In Event: White House and Congressional Politics

Abstract

Since the mid-1980s, presidents have employed statements of administration policy (SAPs) to inform Congress about the executive’s position on pending legislation. These statements are formal communications and delivered to relevant leaders and members of Congress about pending legislation. SAPs have been crucial for research on presidential position-taking including the issuance of veto threats. While the content of SAPs has not always been paramount in these previous studies, these communications allow presidential scholars to examine presidential involvement in the legislative process while it unfolds.

How do presidents make use of this legislative tool? Prior research suggests that SAPs are multifaceted and can be used for both purely rhetorical purposes, such as credit claiming, as well as strategically for position taking and making threats. We build on this prior research and test related expectations regarding how SAPs should be used and the influence that they should have. We also provide a rich descriptive analysis of SAP content over the past several administrations.

In order to examine presidential strategies in deploying SAPs during the lawmaking process, we utilize an original dataset of the nearly 2,500 SAPs spanning the Clinton through the Obama administrations. These data represent all two-term presidencies during which SAPs were used throughout the administration. Each SAP is coded for its rhetorical content, position, and whether a veto threat was included. These data are combined with information about the bill itself, including the ultimate fate of the legislation in question.

Our results suggest that presidents do in fact use SAPs strategically and also that they are used for a variety of distinct purposes. Our findings on the influence of SAPs on the legislative process and outcomes, however, are mixed. Ultimately, our research reinforces the importance of SAPs in inter-branch bargaining over legislative content and suggests several new avenues of inquiry.

Authors

• Ian Ostrander, Michigan State University

• Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University