Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior

• In Event: Covert Action and Intelligence

Abstract

High-quality strategic intelligence is commonly considered to be a stabilizing factor in international relations, steadying decision-making, and preventing misunderstandings and surprise attacks. This paper challenges this view as lopsided by arguing that intelligence coups are among the most destabilizing forces in high-stakes security crises. By exposing the opponents’ strategic weaknesses and avenues of attack, extensive intelligence penetration may not only provide its beneficiaries with a potentially decisive offensive capability, but also compels them to use it quickly, before the breach is discovered and the advantage is gone. Also, as the intelligence target is generally unaware of this capability, it does not act as a deterrent that might force it to the bargaining table. Thus, paradoxically, opposing sides are more likely to find a peaceful solution to crises when they do not have extensive strategic intelligence on each other. The paper tests this theory with a comparative study of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and discusses its broader implications for insurgencies and cyber-warfare.

Keywords: strategic intelligence, offense-defense theory, crisis bargaining

Author

• Aleksandar Matovski, Williams College