Rope-a-Dope Politics and the Erosion of Norms

• In Event: Democratic Erosion

Abstract

Abstract
Research on the erosion of political norms in advanced democracies has developed structural explanations that neglect the strategies that political actors employ to violate norms and immunize themselves against the sanctions that norm violations trigger. This paper draws on the literature on gradual institutional change to conceptualize the process of norm erosion, capturing the interactions of norm violators and norm defenders in the metaphor of ‘rope-a-dope politics’, a boxing strategy popularized by Muhammad Ali. A political actor violates a norm (the provocation), endures sanctions for the violation (staying on the ropes), and waits with the next violation until sanctions, due to constant repetition, lose their force (shoot the best shots). Our conceptualization reveals that norm erosion is not a functional process and that the main damage to political norms does not stem from original norm violations, but from the excessive sanctioning practices of norm defenders.
Description
There is no shortage of structural accounts of norm erosion processes and the resulting democratic backsliding that focus “on economic and institutional correlates [rather] than on choices and choosers” (Bermeo 2016, 5; e.g. Rodrik 2018). Adopting a complementary perspective, we present a theoretical argument that democratic backsliding in advanced democracies is a result of norm erosion processes during which political actors employ political strategies that are insufficiently addressed and understood in the discipline. The latter captures norm erosion processes in a simple tit-for-tat logic that emphasizes the impact of structural conditions on politicians’ incentives to violate norms while neglecting the intricacies connected to acts of norm violation. As we will argue, sophisticated political strategies, or ‘techniques of transformation’ (Bermeo 2016), allow politicians to violate norms and simultaneously immunize them against the sanctions that norm violations trigger, thereby preparing the ground for further violations.
Drawing on the literature on gradual institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), this paper conceptualizes the process of political norm erosion in advanced democracies. Our conceptualization carefully distinguishes between the predisposition of political actors to violate political norms (the impact of structural conditions) and the way norm violation works in practice (the intricacies related to agency). This distinction paves the way for examining acts of norm violation in more detail, which we conceptualize as a form of ‘rope-a-dope’ politics. The label of ‘rope-a-dope politics’ refers to the eponymous boxing strategy, popularized by Muhammad Ali after the Rumble in the Jungle, Ali’s 1974 match against George Foreman in Kinshasa, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). During the first seven rounds of this memorable match, Ali combined enraging verbal provocations of Foreman with a rather defensive stance that prevented his opponent from landing telling blows. Ali stayed on the ropes until Foreman became exhausted, allowing Ali to move on the offensive and knock Foreman out in the eighth round. With norm violations, it is an analogous story: A political actor violates a norm (the provocation), endures sanctions for the violation (staying on the ropes), and waits with the next violation until sanctions, due to constant repetition, lose their force (shoot the best shots).
In the paper, we define political norms as informal institutions, elaborate on their functions in institutionally advanced democracies, and assess what the institutional literature says about their change. This sets the stage for conceptualizing political norm erosion as a form of gradual but transformative institutional change and for zooming in on political strategy. We conceptualize norm erosion as a process leading from X (norm violation), through various intermediate steps (interactions), to Y (eroded norms). The various steps are conceptualized as entities engaging in activities, where the activities transmit causal force from one step to the next (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

References
Beach, D. & Pedersen, R. B. 2013. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Bermeo, N. 2016. On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy 27(1):5–19.
Mahoney, J. & Thelen, K. A. (eds.). 2010. Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rodrik, D. 2018. Populism and the economics of globalization. Journal of International Business Policy 1(1):12–33.
Streeck, W. & Thelen, K. A. (eds.). 2005. Beyond continuity: Institutional change in advanced political economies. Oxford University Press.

Authors

• Fritz Sager, University of Bern

• Markus Hinterleitner