The Electoral Logics of Restrictions on Media Freedom in Venezuela (2002-2015)

• In Event: Autocratic Institutions and Elite Control

Abstract

The media in democracies are in a unique position: they can shape public opinion, set agendas, facilitate public debate, safeguard the transparency of political processes, and foster competitiveness and fairness in elections. Because of these same reasons, however, incumbents in democracies may use restrictions on media freedom as a political tool. But while the purpose of restrictions may be straightforward (winning elections), one could argue that there are many strategic and nonstrategic ways in which restrictions on media freedom could be deployed. Using an original dataset of government-led restrictions on media freedom which includes all instances of legal restrictions, threats by public officials, and actions by national security forces against media outlets and workers in Venezuela (2002-2015), I test whether and under what circumstances assumptions about the electoral logic of government-led restrictions on media freedom hold.

In the political science and media studies literature there are three arguments regarding the logic behind governments’ targeting of oppositional media in electoral contexts. The first is that there is a competitive logic behind the decision of democratically elected governments to use anti-democratic strategies to stay in power. Under this logic, governments are expected to be more likely to restrict media freedom when they depend on a small margin of votes to win elections (Schedler 2013; Levitsky and Way 2010).

In contrast to the competitive logic, the partisan logic suggests that, given partisan misalignments between the state and the media, the larger the advantage of a given faction, the higher the government’s incentive to restrict media freedom. The nature of partisan misalignments may be ideological, such as in cases where left-wing governments lash out against media outlets that are conservative or have colluded with conservative governments in the past (Boas 2013; Kitzberger 2009, 2012; Lugo-Ocando 2008; Artz 2017), but can also result from the incumbent’s contention that the media are biased against the government, regardless of ideology. Under this logic, restrictions are less likely if electoral support for each faction is balanced and more likely if one faction counts on the majority of electoral support.

Finally, a third logic suggests governments can choose to restrict media freedom on election days and on the days following an election to prevent the dissemination of destabilizing information about electoral frauds. This strategy may be motivated by an actual electoral fraud but could also stem from the fear that the opposition adopts a strategy of calling for protest even if elections were competitive (Magaloni 2010). In any case, scholars have found that media freedom is associated with negative perceptions about the quality of elections (Coffé 2017) and argue that because of the importance of the integrity of elections, incumbents, parties, and observers have incentives to have the last word about the quality of election administration (Kerr and Lührmann 2017).

By estimating the effect of elections, electoral campaigns, and electoral competition on the likelihood of government-led restrictions at the municipal level in Venezuela, I find evidence that governments follow all three logics when it comes to restricting media freedoms. Incumbents can use restrictions on media freedom in the context of close electoral races, out of partisan spite, and as an attempt to limit the dissemination of information about the integrity of elections. However, they are more likely to privilege one logic over the other depending on the types of electoral contests. Specifically, I find that while the Venezuelan government generally targets opposition strongholds during the year, its focus shifts to competitive municipalities during electoral campaigns for local and parliamentary elections (where margins do matter).

Author

• Kyong L. Mazzaro, The Graduate Center, CUNY