Theorizing Proxies and IR: A Typology of Outsourcing Coercion

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security II

Abstract

• The use of proxies is, and has been, an integral feature of statecraft. Whether it’s mercenaries, terrorists, or rebel groups, states find it both useful and at times damning to contract coercion to non-state actors. However, despite being both a common and varied feature of statecraft, the study of proxies in political science is relatively limited. What explains the decisions to use or support a proxy? Is the use of proxies simply a low cost strategy? While a growing literature is recognizing and examining the role of external actors in civil wars and the use of proxies internally, along with previous work on state sponsored terrorism, we do not have a proper theoretical framework to study proxy/state relationships. I offer a conceptual typology for incorporating the uses and roles of proxies in IR. Accordingly, I seek to examine the tradeoffs inherent in the use of proxies and provide a better understanding of not only the benefits, but the drawbacks as well. I argue that inherent in the use of proxies are tradeoffs, defined by the relative values of deniability, efficiency, control, and capability. I conclude with potential policy implications and identify several areas of future research.

Author

• Andrew Scott Bowen, Boston College