Beating the (Nuclear) Clock: Testing the Rate of Counterproliferation Policy

• In Event: The Process of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation

Abstract

New proliferators like Iran and North Korea have proven especially resistant to counterproliferation efforts, meaning negotiations and international engagement often take years to reach a resolution. All the while, the contested nuclear program continues to advance. Given these risks of spreading sensitive technology (up to and including nuclear breakout) and the accumulating costs of prolonged engagement, counterproliferation policies are most effective when they quickly succeed. However, rate of success is a largely overlooked aspect of policy analysis, meaning that existing literature fails to account for the accumulating risks and costs of engagement. This paper therefore tests the hazard rate for counterproliferation policy outcomes, using a newly compiled comprehensive dataset covering counterproliferation policies from 1945-2012. The results indicate that some cooperative inducements like nuclear cooperation agreements lead to nuclear reversal more rapidly, while common coercive strategies like economic sanctions take longer and with significant risks of inciting further proliferation instead. These results help expand our understanding of policy effectiveness and have important implications for current international security challenges.

Author

• Ariel F.W. Petrovics, Harvard University