Leveraging Latency: How Technology Shapes the Attractiveness of Nuclear Bargains

• In Event: The Process of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation

Abstract

Why do nations leverage nuclear technology to practice compellence in world politics? Over the last 75 years, a diverse group of more than 30 countries invested in nuclear latency – the technical capacity to produce atomic weapons on short notice – for a variety of economic and security reasons. Yet many attempted at some point to compel concessions from the United States by wielding the threat of proliferation. What factors account for this propensity to select compellence with nuclear latency? This paper claims that the likelihood of compellence hinges on variation in the dual-use distinguishability of nuclear technology: whether it easier or harder to distinguish military from civilian intentions. Compellence is an attractive strategy when future intentions are difficult to assess from nuclear capabilities with high confidence, thereby opening up room to bargain for concessions in exchange for resolving this proliferation concern. On the other hand, coercive diplomacy loses its allure when technology reveals accurate information about the future trajectory of the nuclear program and cannot be manipulated to practice deception. The paper uses historical case studies to trace out how the evolution of nuclear technology changed this information environment for nuclear bargains over time.

Author

• Tristan A. Volpe, Naval Postgraduate School