Credit, Blame, and Substitution: Mexico City's Underprovision of Water

• In Event: Service Provision in the City: Successes and Failures

Abstract

Given the existence of a grid with nearly universal coverage, why does Mexico City provide such low quality water to so many of its residents? Why don't residents demand better provision of such a basic service? In this paper, I argue that in a large, federal megacity like Mexico City, demand for better water is undermined; first by a lack of clarity of responsibility, and second by the separable nature of the private elements of water provision. When the middle class and rich can meet their demands at least for drinking water by substituting, and politicians can gain clientelistic
rewards for "saving the day" for the poor, the demand for quality improvements will "leak", eroding incentives for better provision. In the extreme, these characteristics
create incentives for politicians to undermine the quality of the grid in order to create the opportunity to save the day. I analyze fourteen years of data on water rationing in Mexico City, as well as qualitative evidence conducted from Mexican households, to try to understand the incentives that lead to underprovision.

Author

• Alyssa Huberts