Constituency Service in Costa Rica: Distribution of Local Public Goods

• In Event: How Electoral Rules Shape Parties & Party Systems

Abstract

How do the legislator's ideological preferences and the control of the party leaders affect the type of constituency service in their district? Previous literature has emphasized the influence of institutional rules such as the electoral system and the possibility of re-election in constituency service. In Latin America, research has identified the recurrence of this phenomenon, however, little is known about the type of response of legislators to the district, especially in non-re-election contexts. Due to the above, the evidence on the effort of the legislators in providing local public goods is scarce. This paper argues that greater control of national party leaders and the self-location of legislators on the left leads to a greater provision of local public goods. A database was built for the 2006-2010 legislature in Costa Rica, where the unit of analysis is the legislator and bill initiatives. The hypotheses were evaluated using a fractional regression model and the preliminary results are consistent with the argument.

Author

• Monica María Lara Escalante, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas