Explaining the Development of Caucus Fundraising in American Legislatures

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics II & State Politics and Policy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: State Politics and Policy

Abstract

In modern American politics, members of both Congress and many state legislatures spend a substantial amount of time and effort raising funds on behalf of their parties. Under what conditions do parties develop systems to incentivize this behavior? This paper uses actual contribution data from legislatures in 49 states to answer this question. I construct an original dataset linking nearly 10,000 state legislators to over 15,000 leadership PACs and campaign committees over a 12 year period. Using panel data designs, I show that when majority status in a legislature is closely contested, members give more to their parties and their parties' candidates. In addition, both the legislators making the contributions and the targeting of the money is consistent with party-directed giving, as opposed to the pursuit of individualistic goals. These findings demonstrate the ways in which party institutions develop in response to electoral context, as well as increasing our understanding of the role money plays in legislatures.

Author

• Michael Kistner, Princeton University