Rewarding Resistance? The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Aid Allocations

• In Event: The Changing Landscape of Aid: Conflict, Natural Disasters and New Donors

Abstract

A key policy tool in the reconstruction of post-civil war societies is development finance. Surprisingly though, there is little research that systematically investigates how donors allocate aid in post-conflict environments, and how this affects development and peace outcomes. We study the role of peace agreements and power sharing in avoiding political capture of aid. Power sharing in particular should ensure that political minority groups benefit from post-conflict aid allocations. We argue that the involvement of former rebel factions in the government of a country will decrease the opportunity for the incumbent ruler to allocate aid to reward loyalty and buy off potential contenders focusing only on a narrow support base. To test our theory, we are putting together a large dataset on geocoded aid data, geographic settlement patterns and peace agreement, and we are conducting an in-depth field study of Nepal. We study Nepal to learn how support for the Maoist insurgency during the country’s civil war has affected political contestation for aid projects. Nepal is an ideal case because of the relatively recent end of its civil war, variation in government power held by rebel-aligned and non-aligned parties, and excellent data sources on the location of historic aid projects.

Authors

• Marco Nicola Binetti

• Martin C. Steinwand, University of Essex