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To act on behalf of voters, politicians have to rely on beliefs about public will. Previous research has shown that officials often have distorted images of their constituents. However, it remains unclear why elites misperceive voters, and how these constraints can be overcome. I argue that misperceptions result from a combination of differential exposure and personal biases. Inequalities in political voice can generate distorted images of the electorate. However, imperfect information only tells part of the story. Personal biases of elected officials may also hinder the development of accurate beliefs. Representatives may be subject to false-consensus effects, overestimating support for positions they endorse. My arguments are tested in (1) a unique panel of Swedish MPs covering two decades on perceptions of voter preferences, and (2) a survey experiment with local politicians in Switzerland. Study 1 provides observational evidence for the predictions derived from the theory. Study 2 tests whether nudging officials to avoid biases in perceptions of public support for a series of popular votes induces more accurate predictions of referendum results. The results contribute to our understanding of democratic representation and provide guidance to political actors interested in bolstering the links between voters and their representatives.