Election Timing in Autocracy

• In Event: Opposition Strategies and Authoritarian Resilience in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Previous work has focused on election timing in parliamentary democracies, assuming that governments are unable to manipulate election calendar of presidential elections. However, experiences in autocracies strongly suggest that autocrats arbitrarily decide the timing of both presidential and legislative elections. Building upon the literature of autocratic politics, we explore the determinants of election timing in autocracies. We argue that dictators who are concerned with defection of ruling elites are more likely to call off-schedule elections, because elections provide a big chance for the dictator to generate a large scale of mass mobilization which leads to deterring the potential opponents from rebelling against the regime. We also expect that election timing is more likely to be manipulated in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones, because campaigns in presidential elections center on presidential candidates, allowing the dictator to demonstrate his image of invincibility effectively. Our data analysis suggests that autocrats suffering economic stagnation or newly joining elections tend to violate scheduled election dates and these associations become stronger in the case of presidential elections.

Authors

• Masaaki Higashijima, Tohoku University

• Yuki Yanai, Kochi University of Technology