Liberalize and Conquer: Explaining Opposition Strategies in Mexico (1988-2000)

• In Event: Opposition Strategies and Authoritarian Resilience in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Opposition coordination varies widely in electoral autocracies. In some, opposition parties are highly coordinated and create alliances, present joint candidates or common policy platforms. In other autocracies, however, oppositions choose to challenge incumbents separately. What explains variation in opposition coordination? Under what circumstances do opposition parties opt to unite? When do they pursue their own agenda in the struggle for democratisation? This paper seeks to explain how opposition elites make decisions about how to challenge incumbent autocrats and finds that opponents’ decision-making and strategy formation is influenced by the nature of the regime they are facing. I identify variation in repression as a key variable that explains why some oppositions are coordinated (or unified) while others remain divided. Where repression is low and high, opposition coordination is less likely to occur. Yet where repression is at intermediate levels, opposition parties will choose to coordinate to dislodge incumbents. This paper illustrates this argument through the Mexican experience under the PRI (1988-2000) and uses over 50 interviews with party elites along with the analysis of newspapers and existing survey data to establish the effects of repression on opposition coordination at key historical moments.

Author

• Maryhen Jimenez Morales, University of Oxford