Interest Groups, Polarization, and Intergovernmental Tensions in the US

• In Event: Putting State Policy in Context: Federalism, Polarization, and Populism

Abstract

While some level of tension is inherent in the interactions between the national government and the states, in recent years this relationship seems to have grown increasingly uncooperative. One manifestation of this heightened intergovernmental tension is state governments’ increased willingness to challenge perceived federal overreach. This resistance has taken various forms. State attorneys general have sued the national government over its actions in areas like healthcare, immigration, and education reform. In addition, state governments have turned down federal funds to express disagreement with national initiatives, and state legislators have introduced bills that challenge these policies. These examples epitomize what some scholars have labeled a form of ‘fend for yourself and activist form of bottom-up federalism.’

Despite the importance of this growing and forceful state resistance to national policy, little is known about its root causes. Our paper fills this gap in the scholarly literature. It analyzes whether state legislative resistance materializes organically as states act collectively or imitate each other or whether it is spurred by national interest groups and advocacy organizations motivated by partisan or ideological concerns. It relies on a unique dataset of over 2,000 state bills introduced from 2010-2017 that challenge national policies across twelve issue areas. It uses textual analysis (based on plagiarism detection technology) to assess the extent to which state officials are drawing on model legislation from interest groups or bills introduced in other jurisdictions as they challenge national policies. Specifically, we conduct pairwise comparisons between each state resistance bill, every other state bill, and every model bill, to calculate textual overlap scores.

Our analysis finds dozens of examples in which state officials drew on model legislation from interest groups in resistance efforts. However, the use of model legislation by states in this area is dwarfed by the hundreds of bills we identify as relying on state-level precedents. Subsequent multivariate analysis suggests that lower median income levels are associated with greater use of both types of external bill sources while states with less professional legislatures also are significantly more likely to rely on state-level precedents. We conclude by discussing the implications of these patterns for scholars’ understanding of state resistance, policy diffusion, and contemporary intergovernmental relations in the United States more broadly.

Authors

• Mary Kroeger, University of Rochester

• Timothy Herbert Callaghan, Texas A&M University

• Andrew Karch, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities