A Theory of Nuclear Reversals: Filling a Gap in International Security Studies

• In Event: Nuclear Proliferation

Abstract

Do shifts in international nuclear proliferation norms influence state’s decisions to reverse their nuclear weapons programs? Much has been written on why states might forgo pursuit of nuclear weapons, but relatively little has been written about state’s decisions to terminate development of their nuclear weapons programs, a puzzling decision considering the strategic advantages of obtaining nuclear weapons in an anarchic system. In contrast to purely security-based realist and economic and institutional liberal explanations, this paper presents an ideational theory for explaining the puzzle of nuclear weapons program abandonment, focusing on how international norms affect state behavior. I hypothesize that when a state perceives a non-threatening security environment, and when the state has higher levels of democracy, the state will be more likely to be influenced by international norms against nuclear weapons acquisition, and thus more likely to terminate their nuclear weapons development program. Using a mixed methods approach combining quantitative regression analysis with qualitative process tracing, the paper utilizes Brazil as an illustrative case of the theory, showing how the transition to democratic rule in 1989 and ease of tensions with Argentina allowed Brazil to be influenced by international norms against nuclear weapons, leading to termination of their nuclear weapons development program. In sum, the ideational theory proposed in the paper demonstrates a causal mechanism by which international norms can directly affect state policy, even in the security realm.

Author

• Edward Gonzalez, University of Southern California