Compliant Courts: Determinants of Judicial Obedience in Postcolonial Regimes

• In Event: The Political Economy of Rule Law: Courts, Land Rights and Legal Recognition

Abstract

One of the most enduring legacies of British colonial rule on African states was in the judiciary. However, the degree to which African leaders strategically chose to maintain these structures - and the extent to which they helped fortify and sustain autocratic rule across the continent - remains underexplored. Using recently declassified records on British decolonization and Overseas Development Assistance, this paper examines how African autocrats chose to appoint British expatriates over indigenous Africans because doing so actually helped foster judicial obedience to autocratic rule. While existing scholarship tends to highlight the importance of packing the bench with partisan cronies, I argue that in post-independence Africa, ensuring a regular rotation of expatriate judges was a more reliable way of limiting judicial rebellion because it effectively insulated judges from local political conflicts (who never stayed anywhere long enough to develop strong partisan loyalties) and fostered dependence on the executive (since it was the latter who controls their location and tenure). These findings suggest that British colonial legacies in postcolonial courts may be less an issue of underdevelopment or limited resources, but rather a deliberate perpetuation of practices that were originally established to consolidate authoritarian rule.

Author

• Fiona Shen-Bayh, College of William and Mary