The Populist Playbook

• In Event: Populist Strategies and Leaders

Abstract

Based on the conceptualization of populism as “democratic illiberalism” (Pappas 2019), this paper seeks to compare populists in office and reveal the common pattern of their illiberal rule, or what I will call the “populist playbook.”

According to such a minimal definition, populism represents the view that society is split by one single cleavage effectively separating the vast majority in the electorate from a tiny elite minority, and that that cleavage is unbridgeable. Populist politics, then, is all about social hostility and incessant conflict. In such a view, the rule of law and the protection of minority rights become of secondary importance. What really matters is the satisfaction of the social majority that makes up “the people” irrespective of constitutional legality, established procedural rules, instituted norms of deliberation and overlapping consensus.

Now suppose a populist party has risen to power in some country and has, indeed, ruled that country for a considerable length of time, say for two consecutive electoral periods. What are the characteristics of that rule? To answer this question, the only practical way is to locate any cases that fit the previous situations, examine them comparatively, and draw theoretically informed conclusions.

All in all, in the postwar liberal democratic world in Europe and the Americas, there are seven countries that have already experienced populist parties winning power singlehandedly and, thereafter, maintaining it for at least two consecutive terms. In chronological order of populist rise to power, these countries are Argentina, 1946; Greece, 1981; Peru, 1990; Italy, 1994; Venezuela, 1998; Ecuador, 2007; and Hungary, 2010. This universe of cases offers remarkable variation in terms of geographical and politico-cultural dispersion; time of occurrence, which ranges from the mid-1940s to the present; and ideological variance as it includes both right and left populisms.

It will be shown that, once in power, modern populism typically displays four interrelated –and mutually reinforcing– characteristics: reliance on extraordinary charismatic rather than ordinary leadership; the ceaseless, strategic pursuit of political polarization; a political program based on grabbing the state, emasculating liberal institutions, and imposing illiberal constitutions; and the systematization of patronage as a means to reward supporters and crowd out the opposition.

Charismatic leadership, first, a rare occurrence in liberal democratic politics, is perhaps the most essential characteristic of ruling populism. To put it flatly, no populist party has ever emerged into power without a charismatic leader. Such leaders are distinguished from non-charismatic (i.e., ordinary) ones by combining two core elements – the personal character of their authority and the radicalism of their political aims.

The second major characteristic of populist parties in power is their tactics of stepping up polarization to previously unprecedented levels of intensity. Since populism is neither a coherent ideology nor does it refer to a specific policy program, the polarization it generates is of a more strategic type, always spearheaded by populist charismatic leaders.

The third major common characteristic of populists in power is that they follow closely a well-scripted project of applying democratic illiberalism, which unfolds in three steps: the colonization of the state by appointing party loyalists at all levels of state bureaucracy; a massive onslaught on liberal institutions; and the establishment of a new constitutional order that seeks to replace institutions of horizontal accountability with others of vertical one.

The fourth characteristic that applies across all cases of populist rule is reckless state patronage (or/and other selectively protectionist) policies. Patronage economics is a superior strategy for populists in office for several reasons. First, since they lack a coherent policy agenda, the systematization of patronage relieves populist parties of the need to engage in programmatic linkage strategies with voters. Second, since they address “the people” but remain unconcerned about institutional legality, patronage is presented to voters as a well-meant and ethically righteous social policy— even if it is against the law. Third, populist victories tend to increase the mass of ambivalent voters, those who are dissatisfied with the liberal parties but not yet convinced about the populist promise.

Today, populist leaders enjoy first-term rules in several important countries including the United States, Poland, Mexico and, arguably, Brazil. It is, therefore, imperative that we understand how earlier, as well as contemporary populists, have ruled. For, if there is indeed a populist playbook, new and forthcoming populist rulers are certain to make use of it in exactly the same ways as the former and current populists.

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Pappas, Takis S. Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Author

• Takis S. Pappas, University of Helsinki, Finland