A Comparison of Political Salafism in Egypt and Political Haredism in Israel

• In Event: Islam and Party Politics

Abstract

How and why have fundamentalists, who advocate literal interpretations of scripture, aim the reversal of secular modernity, and aspire for the formation of a theocracy, become politically influential when one would expect them to remain marginal in their mass appeal given their belief in one true faith, exclusive organizations, limited ideological appeal, and their strict codes of behavior for their followers? Specifically, how and why have Political Salafis in Egypt and Political Haredis in Israel, both of which encompass a diverse and amorphous set of actors working inside and outside of formal institutions, acquired political influence beyond their demographic power? And how have they become so influential in such different socio-political contexts?

To study this puzzle, this paper utilizes a cross-religious comparative study and a most different systems approach. It analyzes how both Political Salafism in Egypt and Political Haredism in Israel, despite working in different socio-political contexts, have gone through a similar political evolution from the margins of the political spectrum to its center. Whereas some Political Salafis in Egypt moved from the margins of the political spectrum into the second biggest voting bloc after the Muslim Brotherhood, some Political Haredis in Israel grew beyond their niche appeal amongst the ultra-Orthodox community and into the spotlight holding vital ministries in coalition governments.

Building on the empirical literature developed on the experiences of Christian fundamentalism in the US and on the theoretical literature on religious economic markets, this paper hypothesizes that fundamentalists have gained political influence beyond their demographic appeal because (1) the Egyptian and Israeli states, by simultaneously allowing religious pluralism while also indirectly monopolizing the religious field, have opened the doors for the emergence of a “religious market” wherein a plethora of religious organizations critical, supportive, or neutral of the state emerged, and (2) in this “religious market” fundamentalists built a niche through their ideological purity, personalistic communities, and their strict organizations, which in turn allowed them to play the role of a “kingmaker,” namely the role of a political actor that does not have enough mass support by itself but that still has enough support to influence the results.

By engaging in such a cross-religious comparative study, this paper, foremost, hopes to avoid making essentialist arguments about one particular religious tradition and to focus on the socio-political and organizational structures driving similar developments across dissimilar contexts. In doing so, it also aims to contribute to the literature on religion and politics, and on Middle East politics. Although there are studies analyzing fundamentalism, they study how fundamentalists transform in response to their environments by analyzing the radicalization of fundamentalists into violent extremists, their de-radicalization, or their moderation and thus embrace of religious pluralism in light of external and internal dynamics. This radical-moderate dichotomy in the literature, however, fails to capture how fundamentalists impact their socio-political environments. By focusing on how fundamentalists grow and succeed, this paper focuses on how fundamentalists push for a gradual de-secularization process without altering their ideological and organizational purity. By discussing de-secularization, this paper also aims to contribute to this year’s theme “Populism and Privilege.” In particular, this paper discusses how fundamentalist discourses using religious imagery and ideas, and fundamentalist opposition to “secular elites” have influenced the religious rhetoric of populist leaders aiming to mobilize “moral majorities.”

Author

• Esen Kirdis, Rhodes College