Reforming Rebels: Access and Success of the United Nations Action Plans

• In Event: International Law, Human Rights, and Non-State Actors

Abstract

Can external international actors change the behavior of rebel groups in internal civil wars? World politics has witnessed interactions among non-state actors, with implications for political and societal changes. One of such attempts is the United Nations action plans with non-state armed groups to reduce the use of child soldiers in conflict zones around the world. As a state-centric organization like the United Nations, this engagement is a unique recent phenomenon that begs in-depth analysis. Such humanitarian engagements often occur in conflict zones with actors that difficult to stage reforms. What are the political processes of those engagements and negotiations? Under what conditions does the access lead to success? Our examination of political incentives and conflict circumstances lead us to expect that the confluence of rebel incentive to engage externally, government consent, as well as UN capacity affects rebel groups signing onto UN action plans. Rebel groups’ willingness to engage is important (often transpired by central command and control, and near peace negotiations), subject to political constraints such as government blockage of external actors interacting with their own internal enemies. Our statistical analysis of UN action plans between 2000 and 2015 test our arguments, complemented with four case analysis of the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, the Philippines, and Sudan. Our work has implications for international community’s external engagement operations in internal conflict zones.

Author

• Hyeran Jo, Texas A&M University