On Whose Door to Knock? Lobbyists' Strategic Targeting of Members of Congress

• In Event: Interest Group Access and Influence

Abstract

Organized interests' success in achieving their policy goals is often linked to their ability to cultivate direct contacts with members of Congress. While myriad studies investigate the tactics that organized interests use to secure these contacts, few examine the strategic decisions organized interests make in determining from which members of Congress they seek contacts. Further, the few studies which focus on organized interests' strategic decisions yield conflicting results concerning which types of members are targeted (e.g. allies, committee members, party leaders). This paper brings clarity to the study of organized interests' strategic targeting behavior with two theoretical and methodological innovations. Theoretically, this paper considers how the stage of the legislative process at which a proposal is considered conditions targeting behavior. Methodologically, this paper utilizes a conjoint survey experiment of organized interest representatives to estimate the effects of congressperson characteristics on respondents' strategic targeting choices. The results from this experiment suggest that organized interests' targeting strategies focus on undecided members of Congress, rather than supporters or opponents, and on members whose institutional roles provide them with influence over the fate of the proposal at its current stage of the legislative process.

Author

• David Ryan Miller, Washington University in St. Louis