Voting for Security: When Does Crime Hurt or Help Politicians?

• In Event: The Political Economy of Crime and Violence in Latin America

Abstract

Research on the politics of crime has produced mixed results regarding the role of crime as an electoral asset for politicians. Politicians may exploit the issue to gain political support by taking advantage of citizen concern about insecurity and the fear it generates. But this strategy may not be effective if citizens rely on levels of insecurity as a performance indicator of politicians and withdraw their support for failing to provide public safety. When does insecurity help politicians attract support? When does it become a political liability? I argue that security issues help politicians garner support among voters when crime is rising from relatively low levels but fail to do so when crime levels remain stable, even at high levels. When crime levels are stable, citizens lose trust that politicians can resolve the issue and turn away from politics for solutions to the problem. Such political disenchantment, however, suggests politicians may not be punished for insecurity when it is high, but only when it is low enough that citizens still think politicians can resolve the issue. In this paper, I develop this theory and test it with qualitative evidence from across Latin America.

Author

• Oscar Pocasangre, Columbia University