Updating Presidential Leverage: Comparing Measures of Leverage, Kennedy to Trump

• In Event: The Public Presidency

Abstract

This paper seeks to accomplish two things. First, I update the Index of Presidential Leverage (IPL) developed in Ponder's "Presidential Leverage: Presidents, Approval, and the American State" (2018). In that book, I analyze presidential action through the end of Barack Obama’s first term. This paper brings that analysis current, from Kennedy through the entirety of Obama’s administration and into the second year of the Trump presidency. Specific attention is paid to the Trump presidency as initial observations suggest that while his administration exhibits similarities with the other presidents considered, he also displays striking contrasts. Second, I consider an alternative measure of presidential leverage that I suggested in the concluding chapter of the book, namely presidential approval in the context of congressional approval and trust. I then compare the two measures across a range of presidential actions. Empirically, I examine three representative areas of presidential policy making (the macro politics of agenda setting, the assertion of unilateral prerogatives, and the proportion of landmark legislation that originates with the president as opposed to Congress). I find that presidential leverage has a systematic impact over all of these areas of presidential policy making, and demonstrates that there is statistical and substantive “value added” by employing the operationalized concept of leverage, and comparing the strength and robustness of the two indices of presidential leverage.

Author

• Daniel E. Ponder, Drury University