Breaking Through the Barriers: Immigration Policy Advancement in Congress

• In Event: The Legislative Process in American Politics

Abstract

In the 2018 Gallup polls, the topic of immigration was consistently the first or second most important non-economic problem. Immigration reform has spurred considerable debate among members of Congress but the partisan divide over immigration policy has made gaining consensus for legislation to advance nearly an impossibility. Immigration policy once enjoyed bipartisan agreement, but Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argue that bipartisan consensus over immigration has been eroding since 1982 and the growing polarization between the parties has given way to partisan stalemate (Sinclair 2006). Despite the partisan divide, members of Congress continue to introduce hundreds of bills on immigration with some advancing through the looming legislative hurdles. The question this research addresses is which bills break through the barriers to advance in Congress? And do they follow unconventional or traditional models of policy-making?
We approach the topic of immigration as a complex and multidimensional policy area that has profound effects on political, economic, and social policy dimensions. Our original data set includes immigration legislation from 1981-2016 and our objective is to investigate the factors that shape bill advancement in the policy process. We consider first, the policy problem members of Congress are working to resolve within a framework of eight general categories: legal admissions enforcement and integration, border security enforcement and integration, and interior immigration enforcement and integration (Wong 2016). This approach takes the president into account by considering which bills are formulated in response to the president’s legislative agenda and proposals. A second important consideration is partisanship has had a significant influence on the types of bills members of Congress introduce and cosponsorship (Talbert and Potowski 2002). Legislators have the opportunity to introduce moderate legislation that will appeal to a broader base by bridging the ideological divide. Prominent theories of congressional policymaking (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 1998) suggest that moderation is necessary for legislation to advance. When bills are less aligned with one party’s policy platform, they may attract a wider base of support, including bipartisan cosponsors (Wilson and Young 1997). To understand the influence of policy moderation, we create an ideal point for each bill by taking the median of the combined sponsor and cosponsor ideology scores.
Third, we consider how bills advance procedurally, taking into account that members may begin incorporating unorthodox methods such as riders, amendments, and “legislative hitchhikers” which may help bills advance (Casas, Denny, and Wilkerson 2018).
To understand the why behind bill passage, we use a competing risk model to analyze all immigration bills introduced in the U.S. Senate and House from 1981–2016 at four different stages in the legislative process: (1) Committee Action (hearing or reported out of committee), (2) Passed Chamber of Origin, (3) Passed Second Chamber, and (4) Enacted into Law. The competing risk model enables us to estimate the marginal probability of passage at each stage in the presence of competing events.
We produce expectations of which key factors will enhance or diminish the “risk” of bills advancing through the policymaking process. At the committee stage, for instance, we expect that committee mark-up of a bill would increase the likelihood of it being reported out of committee and decreases the likelihood of no further action or stagnation. At the floor stage, we investigate how rules and procedures have been strategically used either to delay (or kill) bills or to protect immigration legislation in the U.S. Congress. We argue that when a bill is considered under a unanimous agreement it increases the likelihood of passage, while a motion to cloture increases the likelihood of interim votes and decreases the likelihood of final vote. Our expectation is that having an open rule increases the likelihood of votes; yet decreases the likelihood of a final vote. The president can play an important role so we consider the influence of such as Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), executive branch testimony, and speeches and remarks.
After passing both chambers, immigration bills that are more likely to proceed separately in each chamber and therefore, those sent to conference are more likely to be enacted into law. Our expectation and findings are that going to conference committee increases the likelihood of being signed into law and decreases the likelihood of it not being signed.
This research systematically analyzes which immigration bills break through the intricacies and politics of our legislative process in the anticipation that immigration reform is possible if not probable.

Authors

• Michelle Helene Belco, University of Houston

• Jennifer Hayes Clark, University of Houston

• Savannah L. Sipole, University of Houston