Hawks, Doves and Audience Costs: A Survey Experiment

• In Event: Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

Abstract

We show that audience costs can take different forms when leaders’ foreign policy reputations as hawks or doves are inconsistent with what they threaten or promise in the crisis. From an original survey experiment conducted on a U.S. sample (n = 2,389), we found that hawkish presidents who back down from a threat to fight suffer a much smaller audience cost than dovish presidents, while dovish presidents who renege a promise to *not* fight are rewarded by public opinion. These results sit uneasily with the conventional wisdom in audience cost theory that inconsistency in words and actions would lead to strong public disapproval. We also found evidence that hawkish leaders are better able to make peace than dovish leaders because they suffer smaller public disapproval for appearing conciliatory. We show, however, that in addition to a ‘hawk’s advantage’ in making peace, there is also a ‘dove’s advantage’ in warmongering, as dovish presidents receive a higher approval than hawkish presidents for promising to fight and choosing military engagement. Our findings show that presidents, both hawkish and dovish, can be rewarded for making an ‘out-of-character’ move.

Authors

• Kwan Ho Samuel Liu, Cornell University

• Kai Quek, University of Hong Kong