Compliance and Contestation: Avoiding Reputation Costs in IOs

• In Event: Compliance and Defiance with International Law

Abstract

Theories of international cooperation frequently posit that states comply with international commitments in part to avoid reputation costs. International institutions create such effects by legalizing commitments and monitoring patterns of compliance; even international organizations (IOs) with no formal enforcement tools can impose reputation costs by publicly revealing violations. We argue that this prevalent model of reputation overlooks a key feature of the strategic environment: the ability of states to contest alleged violations. States often challenge
judgments of non-compliance from IOs, in an attempt to mitigate reputational damage among domestic and international audiences. We highlight two types of strategies that non-compliant states use to evade reputation costs: challenging the applicability of international rules and attacking the legitimacy of the monitoring institution. We argue that a non-compliant state's use of these strategies is shaped by the presence of overlapping rules in the issue area, as well as the type of audience that can impose costs on the state. We explore these strategies via an examination of non-compliance with international rules prohibiting torture. Our findings show how states attempt to reduce the reputational consequences of violating international commitments.

Authors

• Julia C. Morse, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Tyler Pratt, Yale University