Global Competition, Electoral Rules, and the Anti-European Radical Right

• In Event: The Political Economy of Radical and Populist Parties

Abstract

We argue that political institutions are an important moderating factor in the link between economic conditions and the electoral success of far-right populist parties in Europe. Existing theories argue that Proportional Representation (PR) systems are more permissive to new political entrants trying to mobilize economic grievances, and thus we expect to find a stronger impact of economic conditions on far-right vote shares in PR systems.
To test this argument, we leverage variation in the intensive margin of a major electoral reform and exogenous variation in exposure to global economic competition. Specifically, we analyze the interactive effect of shocks and institutions on the emergence of UKIP as one of the main British parties elected to the European Parliament in the decade leading up to the Brexit referendum. The introduction of districted PR in 1999 enables us to conduct a semi-parametric difference-in-difference analysis to estimate whether district magnitude conditions how constituencies hit by economic shocks shift their support to UKIP. More broadly, our paper sheds light on whether the general reliance on PR in European elections has unintended long-term consequences for the stability of the European Union.

Authors

• Michael Becher, IE University

• Irene Menendez, Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse

• Daniel Stegmueller, Duke University