The Consequences of Intra-Alliance Disagreements Over Imperial Policy

• In Event: Empire, Great Powers, and Methods of External Control

Abstract

The past few years have seen a number of disagreements between the US and its European security partners, raising concerns of an emboldened Russia and more militarized France and Germany. Existing literature, however, provides little insight into the true consequences of intra-alliance disagreements for international order. In the past, competition over empire provided a source of disagreement between states that otherwise had shared foreign policy interests. How did such competition impact the ability of allies to confront shared, proximate threats? Paradoxically, I argue, a high risk of conflict in the near abroad should beget imperial constraint, while proximate peace should have a dangerous, spiral effect. If imperial competition provides an exogenous shock to defense alliances, partners should resolve these differences quickly when the common threat is severe. In contrast, under conditions of relative peace, imperial competition will reduce alliance credibility, leading both partners to adopt a hedging strategy. This internal balancing will further increase each ally’s value for imperial expansion. At the same time, this intra-alliance competition will signal to adversaries that the partnership is ripe for exploitation, leading to external military challenges and wedging strategies. In sum, intra-alliance conflict will prove most destabilizing under conditions of recent peace. Using new data on alliance disagreements over imperial policy between 1815-1989, I test this theory, drawing implications for our understanding of the likely consequences of contemporary crises within Western security alliances.

Author

• Abby M Fanlo, Stanford University