Club Goods Provision: The Effect of Weak Political Parties on Allocation

• In Event: Latin American Clientelism: Who Benefits and How does it Affect Policy?

Abstract

How do politicians strategically allocate funds for political gain in the context of weak political parties? In much of the literature on distributive politics, political parties play an instrumental role in determining the allocation of funds. Particularly in clientelist systems, political parties are seen as instrumental for finding reliable brokers. However, in many democracies, political parties lack both party discipline and the internal capacity to build and maintain clientelist networks. I argue that when parties are unable to oversee clientelist machines, individual senators will use relationships with mayors to determine where to allocate discretionary funds in the form of club goods. I argue that regardless of political party, funds are more likely to be sent to municipalities where mayors have personal clientelist networks in place. Using Colombia as a case, I build a measure to estimate local-level clientelism and the relationship between local clientelism and additional funds from the central government.

Author

• Katherine Marie McKiernan, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill