Correcting the Misattribution Effect of Remittances in Kyrgyzstan

• In Event: Economic and Political Performance in Developing Democracies

Abstract

Remittances, via their income and insurance functions, can generate misattributed evaluations of incumbent governments in remittance receiving states. When remittances increase, remittance recipients reward incumbents for their good fortune. Conversely, when remittances decrease, recipients punish the incumbent government. In effect, they are rewarding or punishing the incumbent for events that happen outside their own state and over which their governments have no little or no control. In this paper, we explore whether it is possible to correct this misattribution bias in Kyrgyzstan, one of the most remittance dependent states in the world. Based on work from Campello and Zucco, we field a framing experiment on social media in Kyrgyzstan where we provide respondents with different information about the relationship between remittances and the performance of the economy. We wish to explore if remittance recipients appraise their governments differently when they are provided with information about the exogenous origin of their remittance payments.

Authors

• Katerina Tertytchnaya, University College London

• Catherine E. De Vries, Free University Amsterdam

• Hector Solaz, University of Oxford

• David Doyle, University of Oxford