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I develop and test a new theory that seeks to explain both the form and success of economic modernization policies. The relative centralization – matched or unmatched – of the state and interest groups, I argue, will determine whether policy-making processes are characterized by state dominance, private capture, corporatism, or pluralism. Moreover, governments will be most successful in promoting economic modernization, I contend, when their level of centralization is aligned with that of interest groups. I find support for my arguments using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. My qualitative test uses extensive archival research to explore the policy process in postwar France, and my quantitative models look at outcomes in sixteen countries across six decades. The results shed light on a wide variety of economic policies and outcomes, while suggesting that policy-making styles are not fixed characteristics of countries but can vary both across time and, critically, across sectors of the economy.