Bureaucratic Access, Institutions & Tariff Negotiations in China's WTO Accession

• In Event: China in the Global Economy: Authoritarian Politics and Economic Liberalization

Abstract

In developing and post-communist countries, trade liberalization is often preceded by democratic reform or fragmentation of power in the ruling party. But how can we explain trade liberalization without democratization in these countries? This article answers this question by developing a theory of authoritarian trade liberalization that focuses on the changing access of domestic protectionist groups to the trade policymaking process in the absence of democratic transition. Applied to China’s WTO tariff negotiations, I show how the Administrative Reform of 1998 removed the access of protectionist bureaucracies to the negotiation process, which in turn allowed Beijing to offer additional concessions in these industries. I find empirical support for this argument using data on China’s negotiated WTO tariff rates as well as declassified internal memos and negotiation documents. The findings not only shed new light on the trade policymaking process at a critical juncture in Chinese history, but also deepen our understanding of the politics of trade liberalization in non-democracies.

Author

• Xiaojun Li, University of British Columbia