State (In)security: The Impact of Insurgencies on Regional Integration Policies

• In Event: Globalization and Conflict

Abstract

Why do we witness divergent levels of regional integration around the world? I assert that the answer lies with an internal security consideration – insurgencies. I hypothesize that a state dealing with a domestic insurgency is less likely to pursue regional integration strategies. If a state’s sovereignty is challenged from within, then the state will be reluctant to give up its sovereign power internationally through institutions like regional trade agreements. My argument is based on both material and ideational logics. Materially, states will be reluctant to regionally integrate because integration involves setting up infrastructure that facilitate the free movement of goods (and often people), which insurgents can use to their advantage. Ideationally, regional integration involves the state diluting its sovereign rights. The state will not wish to send a signal to insurgents that implies their willingness to cede sovereignty willingly in certain circumstances since this might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, insurgencies taking place in regions along an international border will hinder regional integration policies more than those in inland areas. States are more likely to view neighboring states with suspicion if insurgencies occur along international borders. I first find evidence for the adverse impact of insurgencies on regional integration and then compare inland and border insurgencies. I estimate models using a self-coded measure of regional integration based on the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database.

Author

• Shubha Kamala Prasad, Georgetown University