Force Behind the Anti-Corruption: Evidence from China

• In Event: The Ones that Never Knock: Opportunities for Career Advancement and Corruption

Abstract

This paper investigates the political considerations of the anti-corruption campaigns in China. We document the protection and contagion effects of anti-corruption investigations across the inter-politician network. The connections to highly ranked politicians (i.e., members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China) make city politicians less likely to be investigated and receive lighter sentences after being investigated. The investigations of Central Committee members lead to more investigations on their connected city politicians. For identification, we find discontinuous jumps in the investigation probability of local politicians at the mandatory retirement age cut-offs of the connected Central Committee members.

Authors

• Jing Rong Goh, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

• Hong Ru, Nanyang Technological University

• Kunru Zou