A Signaling Theory of Human Rights NGOs

• In Event: Poster Session: African Politics Conference Group; Middle East and North Africa Politics & Human Rights
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Human Rights

Abstract

This paper applies social signaling theory to human rights non-governmental organizations (HRNGOs). Extant research suggests that while some people are motivated to donate to charity for public benefits (NGO outcomes), another important motive is to obtain private benefits, particularly social status and prestige. Signaling occurs when individuals engage in altruistic behavior to signal their type: that they are wealthy, have low discount rates and a cooperative disposition, they are empathic and compassionate, and/or otherwise conform with group norms and expectations. According to the signaling theory of charity, donors receive status benefits, not for the consequences of their donation on welfare outcomes, but for what the donation says about their underlying socially desirable traits. This finding leads to several implications for the study of HRNGOs, which I develop and test in this paper. First, a de-emphasis on HRNGO outcomes between donor and NGO leads to the adoption of HRNGO evaluation policies that are designed to further enhance reputational benefits to the donor, rather than to further optimize the work of the HRNGO. Second, a de-emphasis on HRNGO outcomes between external charity evaluators and NGO leads to the adoption of NGO accountability standard-setting that is disconnected from HRNGO effectiveness. Third, status concerns among donors produce financial incentives for HRNGOs to report human rights violations already known to their donor base, rather than to generate interest in neglected causes. The empirical test supports the signaling theory of charity: donors pay for status benefits; in return, HRNGOs produce reputational benefits.

Author

• Suzie Mulesky, University of Southern California