Civil War and Compliance with State Authority: Evidence from Liberia

• In Event: Short- and Long-Term Implications of Violence for State/Society Relations

Abstract

How does exposure to violence during civil war shape citizens' willingness to comply with state authority, especially in places where non-state actors compete with the state for citizens' loyalties? Drawing on Hobbes's theory of the Leviathan, I argue that in post-conflict settings, citizens who were most severely victimized by violence should substitute away from informal, localized forms of political power, and towards formal, centralized ones—in particular, the state. This substitution effect should last as long as the state succeeds in providing security in the post-conflict period. I test the argument using an original survey and behavioral game in Liberia. I show that Liberians who live in communities that were most severely affected by wartime violence, or who were most severely affected themselves, express a stronger preference for the state as a purveyor of security, and are more compliant with state authorities both in absolute terms and relative to non-state alternatives. More surprisingly, I find that exposure to violence in the post-conflict period does not reverse this substitution effect, and may even strengthen it. I conclude by considering implications for state/society relations in other African countries recovering from civil war.

Author

• Robert A. Blair, Brown University