Arms-Racing in the Shadow of Nuclear Proliferation

• In Event: Making Nuclear Choices?

Abstract

How does the capacity to build nuclear weapons influence international politics? Although just 10 countries have obtained nuclear arsenals many others — known as latent nuclear powers — have the technological capacity to build bombs in short order. This paper investigates how nuclear latency shapes international relations by examining arms race dynamics. Many scholars argue that situations where two rivals have the latent capacity to make nuclear bombs are highly unstable. Fearing that the other state will arm first, this logic goes, a latent nuclear power will build bombs to avoid facing a window of vulnerability or to gain a temporary advantage over its competitor. This paper shows, however, that developing the capacity to make bombs can also deter nuclear proliferation by a rival. It is widely understood that one state’s development of a nuclear arsenal could cause others to follow suit, especially competitors of the new nuclear power. Yet the implications of this logic for deterrence have not been fully developed. Leaders who act strategically will anticipate the effect that arming might have on rivals and, under certain conditions, will refrain from proliferating when an opponent has the capacity to match their arsenal in short order. Developing nuclear latency, then, can serve an important deterrent function. The author tests this argument using statistical analysis and an updated global dataset of latent nuclear capabilities. The findings carry implications for our understanding of nuclear proliferation and the prospects for eventual disarmament.

Author

• Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University