Coalitional Sources of Good Governance: Insights from Africa’s Exemplars

• In Event: Understanding State Institutional Variation in Africa

Abstract

Bureaucratic quality and public service delivery are wanting in most African countries. By contrast, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritius have historically been high performers. This paper argues that there is a shared coalitional basis of their successes. Around independence, when the voting franchise expanded, ruling elites in most African countries used the state as a patronage outlet to build coalitions. But ruling elites in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritius believed that a bloated, patrimonial state would undermine their economic interests. So they built relatively meritocratic institutions instead, which assisted their economic goals amid democratic political uncertainty.

The paper includes three comparative historical case studies. In Botswana (1960-79), democratization provoked cattle ranching elites to build rationalized institutions, for fear the state might become a morass. In Côte d’Ivoire (1946-79), a ruling coalition in service to coffee and cocoa farmers resisted bureaucratic “Africanization,” in order to promote administrative efficiency and coalition members’ economics interests. In Mauritius (1937-68), the first democratic prime minister sought accommodation with the Franco-Mauritian planter class, and together they pursued a strong civil service commission. The paper concludes by contrasting these cases with Ghana and Nigeria, where very different ruling coalitions prevailed and bureaucratic pathologies followed.

Author

• Ryan Saylor, University of Tulsa