Patronage, Technocracy and Cabinet Performance in African Democracies

• In Event: Understanding State Institutional Variation in Africa

Abstract

Patronage – the distribution of state jobs in exchange for political support – is commonly seen as a driver of ineffective governance in Africa and throughout the world. By employing unqualified or politically motivated individuals, patronage undermines both the professionalism and the capacity of the state apparatus. This paper argues that this perspective tends to overlook wide variation in the incentives, goals and actors involved in patronage appointments, all of which can produce variation in the effects of patronage on government performance. Using an original database containing biographical data on all government ministers in Benin and Ghana from the early 1990s through 2016, this paper documents divergent appointment patterns both across and within countries; and demonstrates how these patterns produce more or less stability and coordination at the apex of government. The analysis suggests that leaders of institutionalized political parties engage in greater levels of political patronage but also produce more stable and coordinated cabinets. The findings provide insight into the conditions under which patronage is more or less harmful to government performance.

Author

• Rachel Sigman, Naval Postgraduate School