Rebel Taxation: Between the Moral and Market Economy

• In Event: State-Armed Group Relations: Cooperation, Conflict, and Cooptation

Abstract

Can a rebel organization ever engage in taxation? Or, as a non-state actor, is it axiomatically engaged in extortion? Among the more enduring tropes in literature on organized violence is that taxation by a rebel organization is no different than a protection racket organized by a criminal mafia. I argue that this economic instrumentalism is inadequate for understanding the logic of rebel taxation. Of course, taxation is always concerned with revenue generation. But rebel taxation is also overlaid with political and social valences which rarely draw mention. I introduce several non-economic logics for rebel taxation. Some of these have no direct economic benefit while others are secondary to the economic rational. These include taxation as a symbolic component of stateness, the role it plays in reinforcing the rebels’ ideological position, its capacity to define a particular social constituency, as well as its regulatory dimensions, all essential concerns for any political authority seeking legitimacy. I explore these arguments through detailed field work on four contemporary rebel groups in Colombia (FARC), India (NSCN-IM), Sri Lanka (LTTE) and South Sudan (SPLA). I argue that rebel taxation should be understood as a technology of governance, potentially even more so than its immediate economic purpose.

Author

• Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Vassar College