Labour Rights: It's All Of Our Business

• In Event: Labor and Firms in the Global Economy

Abstract

This paper argues that if global buyers and trade partners provide economic incentives for pro-labour reforms then low/middle-income country governments may reduce labour repression, perceiving it as conducive to export growth. Seeing de jure policy reform, domestic activists and reformists become less fearful, and mobilise for substantive change. However, if buyers and trade partners do not provide incentives for pro-labour reforms, repression persists (notwithstanding private regulation, civil society financing, and economic upgrading). I suggest that the binding constraint to pro-labour reforms is not domestic politics, but global economic governance.

There is strong disagreement about how to abate labour repression in global supply chains. Some hold that factory working conditions can be improved via private regulation (even if workers cannot protest abuses or agitate for wage hikes). Others emphasise organised labour (and proffer overseas development assistance, to build capacity). A third set underscores buyers’ sourcing strategies, and global economic governance. This paper assesses their relative importance, by tracing the drivers of pro-labour reforms in Vietnam and Bangladesh.

Single-part Vietnam and multi-party Bangladesh are ideal comparisons for five reasons. First, both governments prioritise export-led growth, and face economic incentives to keep costs low. Second, they exemplify different kinds of labour repression. The Government of Vietnam prohibits independent labour unions – to prevent public critique and preserve regime legitimacy. Independent activists are beaten, detained, and arrested. Enterprise-level strikes are permitted, so long as they are not coordinated, violent, or challenging the VCP. Meanwhile, the Government of Bangladesh legally permits independent trade unions (except in export-processing zones), but restricts their activities through police brutality, the labour law, and a hostile bureaucracy (hindering registration). They perceive cheap labour as conducive to labour competitiveness. Despite mass strikes, economic upgrading, and private regulation, labour repression persists. Domestic activists have struggled to reform industrial relations.

But both governments recently rescinded restrictions on autonomous labour – because they perceived this as conducive to export growth. Vietnamese leaders were keen to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and benefit from greater market access. US Congress insisted upon pre-ratification reforms: independent unions. Strict conditionality incentivised and legitimised more open discussions about freedom of association. This culminated in Resolution 6: permitting independent trade unions.

Similarly, Bangladesh loosened restrictions on independent trade unions when they thought this was essential for export growth. After the horrific Rana Plaza factory collapse (which killed over a thousand garment workers), and international media outcry, the Government feared buyers would flee Bangladesh. Both governments initiated de jure policy reforms. These may have been intended as mere veneers, placating global buyers and trade partners. However, they were nonetheless significant: emboldening emboldened domestic activists and reformists: catalysing union registrations and organising in Bangladesh, for instance.

Reform stalled when economic incentives rescinded. Following Trump’s election, the USA withdrew from TPP. Subsequent trade deals with the EU and CPTPP did not stipulate independent unions. Labour reform was put on hold. Meanwhile, US buyers continued to source from Bangladesh, while squeezing prices, and without requiring pro-labour reforms (Anner, 2018; Ahlquist and Mosley, 2018). The Governments of Vietnam and Bangladesh ceased to regard labour repression as an impediment to export growth, so violently cracked down on activism, reinstilling fear.

Reflecting on these case studies, this paper contributes to wider research on labour repression in global supply chains by: (1) underscoring global economic incentives; (2) revealing iterative synergies with domestic activism; (3) challenging alternative hypotheses, which see domestic politics as the primary source of (and solution to) labour repression; and (4) theorising change by attending to people’s expectations and perceived interests (thereby connecting the micro and the macro). Going forwards, we need to understand how high-income countries can entrench pro-labour incentives in global supply chains.

Author

• Alice Evans, King's College London