Effects of Campaign Spending Rules on Candidate Selection and Election Outcomes

• In Event: Campaigns 1

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of electoral campaign financing rules on electoral outcomes. Using a rich data set of French legislative, municipal, and departmental elections since 1958, we test whether campaign expenses reimbursement by the state affects the degree of political competition, turnout, and incumbency advantage. Candidates are eligible for reimbursement and face campaign spending ceilings if and only if they obtain more than 5 percent of the votes, in districts hosting more than 9000 inhabitants. We use regression discontinuity designs around both the vote share and population thresholds. We first test whether campaign expenses reimbursement and ceilings affect the pool of competing candidates and, in particular, whether candidates of smaller parties and independents are more likely to run, and run again, when campaign expenses are reimbursed, thus fostering electoral competition. In addition, we investigate voters’ response and test whether increased competition resulting from campaign expenses reimbursement and ceiling translates into increased voter turnout and reduced incumbency advantage.

Authors

• Vincent Pons, Harvard Business School

• Nikolaj Broberg, European University Institute

• Clémence Tricaud, Ecole Polytechnique