Implementation of Peace Agreements and Post-Conflict Outcomes

• In Event: Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Abstract

Previous studies show that conflict is less likely to recur if the implementation of an agreement is successful. What is more puzzling, and yet to be explored fully, is what leads to successful implementation and why some partial or failed implementation cases lead to conflict recurrence while others do not. I argue that bargaining between parties does not stop once an agreement is signed. Instead, they continue bargaining in the implementation stage updating their beliefs on the gains to be made by staying in the peace process or abandoning it. Parties will continue implementation as long as the costs of non-compliance remain high during post-conflict environment. Non-state actors, especially, are benefited by retaining the capability to enforce the agreement and hold the state accountable for poor implementation performance. Greater levels of military guarantees that do not disrupt the bargaining range in the post-conflict environment will lead to higher levels of implementation. Conversely, if the rebel loses its military capability, the state will have reduced incentive to continue implementation. While the level of implementation is likely to be lower in these cases, the likelihood of conflict recurrence is also reduced. Thus, changes in the bargaining range from the time of signing the agreement until the end of the peace process can explain the different peace process outcomes, i.e., conflict recurrence, successful implementation, or partial/failed implementation without conflict recurrence, and the overall level of the implementation, i.e., the percentage of the agreement that is implemented. I test these propositions statistically by using several approaches to account for potential selection biases and an original dataset on agreement implementation that disaggregates implementation progress by actor over time. The analysis of all final peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2009 provides strong support for the proposed relationships.

Author

• Deniz Cil, University of Maryland, College Park