Revisiting the Justice Argument: Fairness, Compensation, and Antidote

• In Event: Political Representation, Power and Inequalities

Abstract

This paper calls for revisiting an under-theorized argument for descriptive representation, namely the justice argument. Drawing on the work of Anne Phillips, Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser, I identify three different senses of justice: fairness, compensation, and antidote. For instance, Anne Phillips depicts the justice argument as derived from the intuition that “it is patently and grotesquely unfair for men to monopolize representation.” In contrast, Iris Marion Young, understood descriptive representation as a form of compensation for and “an antidote to past wrongs.” Iris Young famously argued that “Democratic political movements and designers of democratic processes can promote greater inclusion in decision-making processes as a means of promoting more just outcomes” (2000, 17). Nancy Fraser's work on Justice Interruptus suggests two theoretical frameworks: recognition and redistribution. In other words, the substance of justice depends on "who gets how much" as well as on "how group identities are identified and understood." By revisiting these different senses of justice, I hope to show the contradictory logics implicit in the justice argument as well as how these contradictory logics generate new research questions for those investigating the impact of descriptive representation.

Author

• Suzanne Dovi, University of Arizona