The Moderating Effects of Knowledge on Incentives and Predictions about Politics

• In Event: Biased Perceptions and their Influence on Opinion

Abstract

Predictions are central to individual democratic competence. Reasoned political choice requires the ability to predict what might occur in the future. While scholars have studied individual determinants of predictive accuracy, less is known about how to affect individual predictive accuracy. Previous experimental research demonstrates that financial incentives can lead to improvements in both political knowledge and predictive accuracy. However, less is known about how prior knowledge moderates the effects of financial bonuses on accurate predictions. Incentives encourage individuals to exert effort to make predictions, and therefore we expect that financial incentives will have a larger effect on respondents with greater political knowledge because their prior knowledge will make increased effort more likely to lead to accurate predictions. Through several experiments, we demonstrate that prior knowledge interacts with financial incentives to moderate the effects of incentives for accurate predictions. The results raise important questions about citizen competence in democratic states, suggesting that even when given incentives for accuracy, people’s prior knowledge shapes their ability to use information to make accurate predictions about politics.

Authors

• Nicholas Weller, University of California, Riverside

• Thomas Jamieson, University of Nebraska, Omaha